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The  innovation  systems  approach  offers  a framework  to identify  what  inhibits  the  genera-
tion,  diffusion  and  implementation  of innovations.  It  prescribes  that  interventions  should
target  systemic  problems  that  inhibit  the  system  from  functioning  well.  In  current  literature,
systemic  problems  are  typically  identiﬁed  independent  from  each  other,  after  which  inter-
ventions  are  formulated  for each  one  separately.  The  following  will  argue  that,  next  to the
problems  themselves,  also  the  interactions  between  the  problems  are  of key  importance
when  designing  intervention  strategies.  We  analyze  the Dutch  energy-efﬁcient  housing
innovation  system  and  conclude  that  neglecting  interactions  between  systemic  problems
may  not  only  lead  to  inaccurate  problem  diagnosis,  but  also  to  ineffective  or even  counter-
productive  interventions.
©  2016  The  Authors.  Published  by  Elsevier  B.V.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
. Introduction
Literature on innovation systems advocates that both the complex interaction between actors and the prevailing institu-
ional infrastructure strongly affect the speed and direction of innovation (e.g. Edquist and Johnson, 1997; Chaminade and
dquist, 2010). Although initially the innovation systems approach focused on nations (Lundvall, 1992), additional strands
ave emerged for sectors (Malerba, 2002), regions (Cooke et al., 1997) and technological domains (Carlsson and Stankiewicz,
991; Carlsson et al., 2002; Hekkert et al., 2007). Nowadays, the most common term for the latter is Technological Innovation
ystem, or TIS (Bergek et al., 2008; Markard and Truffer, 2008; Jacobsson and Jacobsson, 2014). Since the innovation systems
pproach helps to identify how innovation can be stimulated, it has become a popular framework with both researchers and
olicy makers.
The innovation systems framework breaks with the neoclassical policy rationale based on market failures, as the latterPlease cite this article in press as: Kieft, A., et al., Interactions between systemic problems in innovation
systems: The case of energy-efﬁcient houses in the Netherlands. Environ. Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.10.001
s deemed unﬁt for the non-linear and complex nature of the innovation process. Instead of targeting market failures,
nterventions should target problems that inhibit the system from functioning well. Problems that may  be targeted are, for
nstance, a lack of seed capital that restricts entrepreneurial startups or a negative image of a technology that inhibits demand.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: a.c.kieft@uu.nl, alcokieft@gmail.com (A. Kieft), r.harmsen@uu.nl (R. Harmsen), m.p.hekkert@uu.nl (M.P. Hekkert).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.10.001
210-4224/© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
.0/).
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Different terms have been used to indicate problems in innovation systems, including systemic problems (Chaminade and
Edquist, 2010; Wieczorek, 2014), system failures (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005; Weber and Rohracher, 2012) and blocking
mechanisms (Bergek et al., 2008).1
Although especially the term blocking ‘mechanism’ suggests that feedback plays an important role to understand prob-
lems in innovation systems, problems are, to the best knowledge of the authors, not conceptualized as such. Even though
some literature mentions that problems in innovation systems reinforce each other (Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001; Klein
Woolthuis et al., 2005), the overviews and categorizations of potential problems are presented as lists and thereby suggest
conceptual independence (see e.g. Chaminade and Edquist, 2010; Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005; Negro et al., 2012; Weber and
Rohracher, 2012). Case studies also reﬂect this conceptual independence of problems since they generally discuss problems
one by one (see e.g. Faber and Hoppe, 2013; Patana et al., 2013; Wieczorek et al., 2013).
The main premise of this paper is that problems in innovation systems often interact, and may  form ‘mechanisms’,
that in turn prevent the innovation system to develop. In order to further explore this we  carried out a case study of the
Dutch energy-efﬁcient housing innovation system. Our aim is to answer the following question: Does an innovation system
analysis giving explicit attention to problem interactions yield contrasting or additional insights compared to an analysis of
independent problems?
2. Theory
This section will introduce two central concepts from the innovation systems framework, namely system structure and
key processes, will explain how these concepts are used to identify problems and formulate interventions, and discuss why
this current practice may  lead to difﬁculties during the analysis process. The different innovation systems strands (National,
Regional, Sectoral and Technological) will be discussed collectively, because, even though they slightly differ in how they
deﬁne and use central theoretical concepts, they all follow the same rationale in relation to problems: unsatisfactory system
performance is caused by problems that pertain to the system structure.
The structure of any innovation system consists of structural elements that interact. There is a broad consensus in the
literature that Actors, Interactions between actors (networks), and Institutions are structural elements of an innovation
system. Furthermore, authors often make use of additional elements, such as Technology or Infrastructure in TIS literature
(Chaminade and Edquist, 2010; Jacobbson and Bergek, 2011; Jacobsson and Jacobbson, 2014; Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005;
Markard and Truffer, 2008; Wieczorek and Hekkert, 2012). It is generally agreed that there are many interactions and
feedback loops between these structural elements (Bergek et al., 2015; Carlsson et al., 2002; Chaminade and Edquist, 2010;
Edquist and Johnson, 1997; Jacobsson and Jacobsson, 2014; Markard and Truffer, 2008; Wieczorek and Hekkert, 2012). This
multitude of interactions and feedback loops between structural elements is what makes an innovation system so complex.
It is difﬁcult to judge or measure whether the structure itself is ‘good’ or not. For example, if ten entrepreneurs are active
in a system, is that sufﬁcient? To tackle this conceptual issue, the focus was  shifted from the structure only to a combination
of structure and key processes (often called functions). Under this new reasoning, the structure is considered ‘good’ if these
functions are satisfactorily fulﬁlled. In contrast, if the function fulﬁllment is unsatisfactory the structure must be considered
‘not good’, and this will result in a system that does not develop at all or that develops in a ‘stunted fashion’ (Bergek et al.,
2008). Although the use of functions is most prominent in TIS literature (Bergek et al., 2008; Hekkert et al., 2007), they have
also been formulated for other innovation system strands (e.g. Edquist and Johnson, 1997; Galli and Teubal, 1997). Since it
is easier to judge or measure the quality of functions than the quality of structural elements, their addition has made the
framework more practical for analysts.
Structure and functions are two sides of the same coin, or as Markard and Truffer have put it: “two intertwined sides of the
same object, the system” (p. 601). Due to the mutual dependence of structure and functions, the preferred approach to identify
problems in innovation systems is to perform a combined structural/functional analysis (Bergek et al., 2008; Wieczorek and
Hekkert, 2012). Both Bergek et al. (2008) and Wieczorek and Hekkert (2012) propose a stepwise analysis approach, and
although the prescribed steps slightly differ, they have much in common: (1) an overview of the system structure is created,
(2) the current system performance is determined through a functional analysis (3) for the weak functions the underlying
problems that pertain in the system structure are identiﬁed, and (4) interventions are formulated to alleviate these problems,
thereby improving the function fulﬁllment and thus the system performance. Functions are in this way  placed ‘in between’
the system structure and system performance.
Literature on innovation systems mentions in some places that problems interact. For instance, “[. . .]  there is a range
of obstacles [. . .],  which may  act independently but are likely to reinforce one another” (Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001),
or “Most problems in the innovation system will not be uni-dimensional but will consist of a complex mixture of causes
and effects [. . .]” (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005). Despite this, problem interaction has not yet received much conceptual
attention. For instance, literature that discusses potential problems in innovation systems relates most problem categoriesPlease cite this article in press as: Kieft, A., et al., Interactions between systemic problems in innovation
systems: The case of energy-efﬁcient houses in the Netherlands. Environ. Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.10.001
to single structural elements (a.o. Chaminade and Edquist, 2010; Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005; Negro et al., 2012; Weber
and Rohracher, 2012). Chaminade et al. (2012) puts it this way: “almost each author has his or her own  list of potential
systemic problems” (p.1477), to subsequently add that the types of problems discussed in literature “can be pinned down
1 These terms have nuances of meaning to which we  come back in the Theory section.
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o infrastructure problems, [actor] capability problems, network problems, institutional problems and transition and lock-
n problems” (p.1477).2 Others hint at the conceptual relation between problems and structural elements (Jacobsson and
ergek, 2011),3 or explain that analysts should determine whether “the weakness of the function has something to do with
ctors, institutions, interactions, or infrastructure [emphasis added]” (Wieczorek and Hekkert, 2012). Evidently, there is
oom for exploring the conceptual value of problem interactions in innovation systems.
The limited theoretical attention for problem interactions also reﬂects on case studies, as these – not infrequently –
resent a single independent problem to underlie a weak function.4 For instance, Patana et al. (2013) mention in their
iscussion of the Finish life science innovation system that actors in the ﬁeld are too scattered, leading to difﬁculties in
eciding on a concerted direction. In this example, there is probably another problem that underlies this scattered nature of
he ﬁeld, among other possibilities, a wide spatial distribution of actors, a lack of trust, or possibly a lack of ﬁnancial means to
rganize regular meetings. A second example – related to the function mobilization of resources – comes from the analysis
f the European Wind TIS by Wieczorek et al. (2013). They ﬁnd that “in the future, if the offshore wind system develops,
he scarcity of specialized, deep water vessels may  [. . .]  become a serious constraint” (p304). Yet, it is not explained why
his situation may  arise, even though this can be a result of problems related to, for instance, difﬁculties for vessel suppliers
o get loans (ﬁnancial infrastructure) or a lack of skilled personnel (human infrastructure). These examples show that the
dentiﬁcation of independent problems often leaves questions open about what made them arise, thus posing challenges
or formulating interventions. This does not imply that any innovation system analysis contains loose ends; analysts often
mplicitly give attention to what causes what in their text. Yet, especially for more complex innovation systems it is very
hallenging for an analyst to oversee all problems and all interactions without an explicit analysis of how problems interact.
Authors have used a variety of terms to indicate ‘problems’ in innovation systems; each with its own  nuance of meaning.
irst, the term ‘systemic problem’ is generally used to indicate weaknesses that pertain to the internal system structure
endogenous problems). Second, the term blocking mechanism – prominent in especially TIS literature – points at any
actor5 that causes weak function fulﬁllment. These factors can reside either inside (endogenous) or outside (exogenous)
he system (Johnson and Jacobsson, 2001; Bergek et al., 2008). Finally, although the term system ‘failure’ has been used as
ynonym for systemic problem by some authors (Klein Woolthuis et al., 2005), it is also increasingly employed to indicate
roader issues with an innovation system (Weber and Rohracher, 2012). As it is now, the conceptual link between the terms
ystemic problems, blocking mechanism and system failure is not clear.
In this paper, we focus on the conceptual link between the terms systemic problems and blocking mechanisms and
 based on the insights from our case study – propose a reconceptualization in such a way  that interactions between
roblems become conceptually part of them.6 Instead of using the term blocking mechanism to indicate a problematic
factor’, we use it to indicate a real ‘mechanism’ that consists of interacting systemic problems. Such a blocking mechanism
ill usually include systemic problems that pertain to the internal system structure (endogenous systemic problem), but
an also contain problems from its context (exogenous systemic problem). Note that, by including exogenous problems in
he term systemic problems, we give it a broader meaning than what is currently prominent in literature. This reﬂects the
ncreased attention for the system context in recent literature on innovation systems (e.g. Bergek et al., 2015). Under this new
onceptualization, weak function fulﬁllment and weak system performance may  thus be caused by a blocking mechanism
hat consists of interacting systemic problems. To illustrate how this may  work during an innovation systems analysis, our
ase study makes use of these adapted meanings of the terms systemic problem and blocking mechanism.
We based the selection of our case study on the expectation that an explicit analysis of how systemic problems interact has
dded value especially for innovation systems that share one or more of the following related characteristics: mature, locked-
n (Unruh, 2000), making a transition, and strongly structurally coupled with contextual systems. First, mature systems are
ften relatively large which leads to many feedback loops between elements of the system. Second, such systems are often
ocked into certain technological combinations. For example, the Dutch energy-efﬁcient housing innovation system can be
onsidered a mature sectoral innovation system that is locked into the combination of using little insulation with gas-based
echnologies for heating. Lock-in is not necessarily problematic; such a system may  have developed effective routines to
eal with problems. However, when a transition is desired, this locked-in nature of the system will inhibit change andPlease cite this article in press as: Kieft, A., et al., Interactions between systemic problems in innovation
systems: The case of energy-efﬁcient houses in the Netherlands. Environ. Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.10.001
ay  become the source of problems itself. In our case study, the system is making the transition toward building highly
nergy-efﬁcient houses,7 and the advent of new technologies (e.g. better insulation materials, renewable energy technologies
tcetera), is increasingly putting pressure on current routines. What is more, mature systems often have strong structural
2 The problem category of ‘transition and lock-in problems’ does at ﬁrst sight involve feedback. However, as Klein Woolthuis et al. (2005) persuasively
rgued, ‘lock-in’ is the result, rather than the cause of unsatisfactory system performance and can thus not be classiﬁed as a problem category.
3 They mention: “Indeed, all the four types of system failures identiﬁed by Klein Woolthuis et al. (2005) in their synthesis and re-categorisation of
revious literature on system failures are related to structural components [. . .]” (p46).
4 Some case studies do give explicit attention to how problems interact (e.g. Totin et al., 2012; Amankwah et al., 2012). However, these case studies
oosely make use of the innovation systems framework, do not systematically explore what the additional explanatory power of such an approach is, and
ow  this links up to the theoretical concepts prominent in the innovation systems approach.
5 For instance, Bergek et al. (2010) mention that blocking mechanisms are “factors that provide obstacles to the development of functions” (p131), and
acobsson and Karltorp (2013) use the terms factors and blocking mechanisms interchangeably.
6 In the discussion section we reﬂect further on the conceptual link with the term ‘system failure’.
7 This is in line with the European goal of building only ‘nearly-zero energy’ houses by 2020 as introduced in Council Directive 2010/31/EU on the energy
erformance of buildings (recast) [2010] OJ L153/13 [EPBD recast]. To deﬁne highly energy-efﬁcient, the deﬁnition of a nearly-zero energy building from
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couplings with their context (Bergek et al., 2015). Problems that express themselves in such systems often have their origin
outside of the immediate system boundaries, making it fruitful to analyze how the problems inside and outside the system
interact. In our case study for instance, strong structural couplings with TISs of non-renewable technologies must be broken
down, whereas structural couplings with TISs of renewable technologies must be created or strengthened. Additionally, since
buildings are inherently tied to a certain location, this innovation system is strongly affected by the Dutch geographical and
political context structures, e.g. in the form of the strong Dutch political belief in decentralization as we will see in the case
study (Section 4.1). The combination of these characteristics makes the innovation system of energy-efﬁcient houses in the
Netherlands a good candidate for exploring the merits of an explicit analysis of problem interactions.
3. Method
The data necessary to map  systemic problems, their interactions, and possible blocking mechanisms that these form,
came from the combination of interviews with practitioners and supplementary literature. The interviews were held with
multiple stakeholders involved with highly energy-efﬁcient houses. We  used snowball sampling to identify potential inter-
viewees. In total, 23 semi-structured interviews were conducted – lasting on average two  hours – with government ofﬁcials,
project managers of housing associations, private project developers, construction companies and advisors/consultants. We
collected supplementary literature to clarify statements given by the interviewees, e.g. the exact contents of mentioned laws
and regulations. Adding interviews and literature to the analysis stopped when this no longer led to new insights (theoretical
saturation).
To determine how the systemic problems in this innovation system interact, it is important to know in which phase
of the building process they arise. Our deﬁnition of these phases was based on the Dutch NEN 2574 norm (NEN, 1993),8
to which a Land preparation phase was added. This led to the following phases (1) the Land preparation phase which
includes the construction of basic infrastructures (roads, utility networks etcetera), (2) the Program phase which includes
the formalization of goals and ambitions by project initiators, (3) the building Design phase and ﬁnally (4) the Construction
phase. After the interviewees had mentioned a speciﬁc problem, they allocated it to a certain phase of the building process.
Then, they were asked to explain what had caused this problem to arise and how this problem affected later phases of the
building process. This led to elaborate descriptions of how problems interact.
Cards that resemble ﬂashcards or playing cards were used to structure the interviews (see Fig. 1). There were three types
of cards available: (1) cards for problem categories, (2) blank cards and (3) cards for phases of the house building process.
There were problem category cards for each of the structural elements and functions of an innovation system, for instance,
the card ‘rules and regulations’ related to the structural element Institutions, and the card ‘ﬁnancial resources’ related to the
function Mobilization of resources. These problem category cards were meant to provide the interviewees with ideas for
problem categories, although the possibility of adding additional problem categories was  constantly stressed. The interviews
started by asking what problems inhibit building highly energy-efﬁcient houses in the Netherlands and in which building
phase these problems manifest themselves. For each problem mentioned, a problem category card was  placed on the table
underneath the building phase card to which it corresponds. Interviewees could then specify the problem by writing on a
blank card and placing it on top of the problem category card. If interviewees mentioned a problem that did not directly
relate to the building process, the card was placed on the left side of the unfolding overview. This led to overviews of cards
(for an example see Fig. 1) that were not only accompanied with elaborate explanations for each problem separately, but
also with explanations about how they interact.
The interviews were recorded and transcribed into text. Data analysis consisted of coding and grouping relevant textual
fragments from both the interviews and the supplementary literature.9 During this process, guidelines were used for initial
coding (Charmaz, 2006), open coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) and focused coding (Charmaz, 2006). Next, a diagram was
created to show how the identiﬁed problems interact (Fig. 2 in Section 4.1). The process of creating the diagram resembled
the process of axial coding (Charmaz, 2006). The elaborate explanations that interviewees had given of ‘what caused what’
formed the basis for the interactions in the diagram. Subsequently, a storyline was written to accompany the diagram,
which was structured according to seven main umbrella themes that grouped problems with a certain common ground.
A preliminary version of the diagram and the storyline were discussed and validated in a meeting with ﬁve experts on
energy-efﬁcient houses.
The ﬁnal step consisted of linking the identiﬁed systemic problems to the structural elements, the system functions,Please cite this article in press as: Kieft, A., et al., Interactions between systemic problems in innovation
systems: The case of energy-efﬁcient houses in the Netherlands. Environ. Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.10.001
and to categorize them as national, sectoral or technological. Categorizing problems as national, sectoral, or technological
was straightforward for some problems, but in many cases the allocation process was  fuzzy. For instance, some problems
may have both national and sectoral characteristics (e.g. national regulations about how the land market is organized), while
the EPBD recast is used: “a building that has a very high energy performance [. . .]. The nearly zero or very low amount of energy required should be covered
to  a very signiﬁcant extent by energy from renewable sources, including energy from renewable sources produced on-site or nearby” (p.18).
8 The Use/Exploitation phase was  dropped because it falls outside the research scope. Additionally, the Elaboration phase – of which tender activities
and  price setting are part – was not explicitly used during the interviews because these activities are increasingly made part of earlier phases (see case
study  description).
9 For this purpose, the Computer Aided Qualitative Analysis Data Software (CAQDAS) NVivo was used. NVivo qualitative data analysis software; QSR
International Pty Ltd. Version 10, 2012
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thers have both sectoral and technological characteristics (e.g. construction companies causing technical problems because
f a knowledge insufﬁciency regarding energy-efﬁcient technologies). If allocation was difﬁcult, sectoral was chosen over
echnological and national over sectoral. For linking the systemic problems to structural elements and system functions we
sed the deﬁnitions from Wieczorek and Hekkert (2012). The results of this ﬁnal step can be found in Table 1 in Section 4.2.
To explore the question whether explicit attention for problem interactions during an innovation system analysis yields
ontrasting or additional insights compared to an analysis of independent problems, the data was analyzed in three steps.
irst, two sets of systemic problems that both form a blocking ‘mechanism’ were selected from Fig. 2 and were subsequently
nalyzed. Second, the gained insights were compared to the output of an analysis that only identiﬁes independent problems
for which the results would have resembled Table 1), and third, the outcomes of our analysis were compared to an earlier
nnovation system study of the same empirical domain (Faber and Hoppe, 2013).
. Results
The current situation in the Dutch innovation system of energy-efﬁcient housing can only be understood against the
ackdrop of its history. From the end of World War  II to the beginning of the 1990s, the Dutch house building sector was
haracterized by a high degree of central planning. The national government took the lead in reconstruction activities after
orld War  II and decided on the areas where new houses were allowed to be built. To achieve high efﬁciency, house
onstruction was organized in large projects in which whole neighborhoods were erected and this led to the dominance
f larger construction companies, as only these could deliver the required capacity for constructing whole neighborhoods.
dditionally, row houses became the norm because these could be built efﬁciently in series. Then, in the beginning of the
990s, the national government decentralized responsibilities for constructing houses to municipalities and other local
takeholders, for instance, housing associations and private project developers. To incentivize these local stakeholders to
ake up this responsibility it was decided to restructure the land market, which provides the starting point for discussing
he identiﬁed problems and their interactions.
.1. Interactions between problems in the innovation system of Dutch energy-efﬁcient housesPlease cite this article in press as: Kieft, A., et al., Interactions between systemic problems in innovation
systems: The case of energy-efﬁcient houses in the Netherlands. Environ. Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.10.001
This section provides a storyline to accompany all problems and their interactions as shown in Fig. 2. These problems fall
ithin three problem themes, namely Land market,  Project-based approach (the standard house building process followed in
he sector) and Resources. 11 Each box represents one problem and the connecting lines signify which problems interact. The
10 Most interviewees placed more cards. This example was  chosen for visual clarity.
11 Presenting and discussing all problem themes proved infeasible because of space limitations. A complete description of all identiﬁed problem themes
an  be found in Kieft et al. (2013). The other main themes were Conservatism, Building Concepts, EPC (Dutch calculation methodology for energy-efﬁciency
f  buildings) and insufﬁcient Room for Experimentation.
Please cite this article in press as: Kieft, A., et al., Interactions between systemic problems in innovation
systems: The case of energy-efﬁcient houses in the Netherlands. Environ. Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.10.001
ARTICLE IN PRESSG ModelEIST-226; No. of Pages 13
6 A. Kieft et al. / Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions xxx (2016) xxx–xxx
Fig. 2. Problems and their interactions in the Dutch innovation system of highly energy-efﬁcient houses.
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ifferent box outlines show whether a problem was allocated as sectoral, national, or technological (see Method section).
roblems are placed underneath the building phase in which they arise and next to the problem theme they belong to.
roblems that only indirectly inﬂuence the house building process are shown in the most left column. In the storyline
elow, the terms in italics correspond to the boxes in Fig. 2.
The ﬁrst theme – Land market – starts with the decentralization of housebuilding activities that took place in the begin-
ing of the 1990s. Decentralization was facilitated by setting strict restrictions on the space allotted for development, and
dditionally by creating an open land market in which private actors could compete for this allotted space. This created land
carcity which made land-prices skyrocket whenever a municipality decided to designate an area for constructing houses
this changed temporarily when the ﬁnancial crisis hit in 2009). The national government hoped that high potential gains on
and would persuade stakeholders to enter the land market and start housebuilding activities, thereby removing the need
or national subsidies (Tijdelijke Commissie Huizenprijzen, 2013). Indeed, speculation on land-prices and land development
ecame a proﬁtable business which led to the involvement of private project developers and later also to the involvement of
arge construction companies and housing associations. As a result, most of the land in the Netherlands that has development
otential came into the hands of speculating stakeholders.
Public organizations started to behave like private enterprises.  Housing associations moved away from their core public
ask of providing cheap social housing and became active in the private segment. Municipalities – tempted by potentially
igh proﬁts – also started to develop new housing areas more aggressively. The historic divide between public and private
takeholders faded.
Close interactions between public and private stakeholders at the beginning of the house building process became the
orm. The designated land for a new house building project is usually owned by multiple stakeholders (mostly private
roject developers, housing associations and municipalities). Since ‘the one who owns the land has the right to build’, these
andowners are forced to collaborate. Therefore, these landowners create consortia in which decisions are made in consensus.
Land preparation activities, such as building the road and utility networks, are usually supervised by the municipality.
o organize this efﬁciently, most municipalities ﬁrst buy all the land from the other landowners, and grant them a so-
alled construction claim that gives them the right to buy the land back after land preparation activities are ﬁnished. These
onstruction claims create a monopoly position for landowners as they are the ones that hold the development rights, even
hough they no longer own the land. In this way, construction claims form an almost impenetrable entry-barrier for new
ompanies.
During the consensus processes that are typical within the consortia of landowners innovative ambitions water down
nder pressure of commercial interests. Although municipalities are often ambitious in terms of reaching high energy-
fﬁciency, other landowners are often proﬁt driven and thus disfavor any increase in construction costs. Their monopoly
osition provides them with strong bargaining power, resulting in few energy-efﬁcient technologies in building design.  As a
esponse, municipalities create detailed development plans with strict demands regarding building design and set strict permit
equirements.
To distribute land proﬁts among consortium members, the residual land value calculation methodology became widespread.
his methodology subtracts all costs, for instance construction costs and land preparation costs, from the combined selling-
rice of the houses. What remains is called the residual land value, which is then distributed among consortium members.
n this way, rising house prices increase the already high proﬁts for landowners (before the ﬁnancial crisis).
As most houses in the Netherlands are developed and designed by companies that own  the land (which allows them
o make proﬁt out of land development), the Netherlands counts very few self-built houses.  Potential buyers have to accept
he design choices made by the consortia that construct the houses. In other words, there is a very limited role for potential
uyers (future home owners) in the ﬁrst phases of the house building process, making this innovation system characterized
y an extreme form of supply push.
The second problem theme – project-based approach – collects all problems related to the traditional way of organizing
uilding projects in the Netherlands. In this approach, a speciﬁc development plan that satisﬁes the strict permit requirements
rom the municipality is created for each project. Subsequently, an architect is asked to create a design which is then built by
 construction company. In relation to the project-based approach, interviewees mentioned a deeply rooted distrust between
roject initiators and construction companies,  or a culture of disagreement. To understand why, we have to take a closer look
t what happens within the project-based approach.
The project-based approach is inefﬁcient and expensive in both the program phase and in the design phase. Project initiators
pend large amounts of resources on creating the initial development plans, usually assisted by expensive consultants and
xpensive architects.  Although initial designs often include innovative sustainable technologies, these are often removed to
ffset the high costs of the program and design phases and ultimately lead to little energy-efﬁcient technologies in building
esign. What is more, project initiators (which can be either a private project developer or a housing association) organize a
ender on price and thus grant the project to the construction company that accepts the lowest proﬁt margin. This creates so-
alled chain-pressure for construction companies,  who  subsequently lobby for removing or downscaling remaining innovations to
educe the cost of training their employees. Additionally, costs are reduced by working fast, which leads to construction ﬂawsPlease cite this article in press as: Kieft, A., et al., Interactions between systemic problems in innovation
systems: The case of energy-efﬁcient houses in the Netherlands. Environ. Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.10.001
nd technical problems. Unsatisﬁed with the ﬁnal build quality, project initiators tighten speciﬁcations for the next project, and,
y doing so, increase the chain pressure for construction companies.  To defend their proﬁt margin, construction companies
ubsequently try to claim additional costs and ﬁle suit if this is not accepted by the project initiator. Some interviewees blame
he ‘conservative’ construction companies for this situation, while others blame the ‘unprofessional’ housing associations.
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The use of so-called building concepts provides – in theory – an alternative for the inefﬁcient project-based approach. A
building concept is a standardized design method that combines standard building components in different ways to create
varieties in building design. Using a building concept has the potential to reduce the high costs of both the program and the
design phase since the creation of a speciﬁc development plan for each new-to-build area can be simpliﬁed. This not only
reduces the activities of the project initiator, but also reduces the need for consultants and architects. However, persuading
project initiators to choose for a building concept is difﬁcult. There are strong vested interests in ‘keeping things as they are’,
because many organizations beneﬁt from the project-based approach. In general, conservatism is high among established
parties (project initiators, consultants and architects) leading to a strong lobby for the project-based approach. Project initiators
keep choosing for the project-based approach, even though more efﬁcient approaches are available.
The third and ﬁnal problem theme – Resources – combines all problems related to ﬁnances. The ﬁrst two themes already
mentioned the inefﬁcient and expensive project-based approach and the high proﬁts for landowners (especially before the ﬁnancial
crisis). These proﬁts are rarely used to fund energy-efﬁciency measures12; instead, most municipalities use the land proﬁts
to increase the general municipal budget and private project developers just increase their proﬁts. For the limited take up
of energy-efﬁciency, private project developers point at the fact that energy-efﬁciency measures are low on the priority list
of potential homebuyers. They attribute this ﬁrstly to limited mortgage options to ﬁnance energy-efﬁciency measures, and
secondly to a knowledge insufﬁciency about the beneﬁts of living in a highly energy-efﬁcient house. In addition, housing
associations face insufﬁcient ﬁnancial resources, because of strict capital requirements that inhibit investments and increased
landlord fees.
Table 1 provides an overview of how all problems identiﬁed in this research relate to the main concepts of the innovation
systems framework. This table represents the results we would have had if we  had stopped the analysis after identifying
only independent problems.
4.2. Independent problems versus interacting problems
In this section, we explore the question whether attention for problem interactions yields contrasting or additional
insights compared to an analysis of independent problems. First, we select from Fig. 2 two  sets of problems that together
form a blocking ‘mechanism’, under the new meaning of the term as a mechanism that consists of interacting systemic
problems. Then, we analyze these two mechanisms and reﬂect on whether the same insights would have emerged if the
analysis was stopped after independent problems were identiﬁed (Table 1). Third, we compare our results to an earlier
innovation system study of the same empirical domain (Faber and Hoppe, 2013). The two selected sets of systemic problems
and their relations are placed into Fig. 3.
The ﬁrst blocking mechanism (left side of Fig. 3) consists of a set of systemic problems that together lead to an uneven
distribution of ﬁnancial resources in the system. Together, these problems thus negatively inﬂuence the function MobilizationPlease cite this article in press as: Kieft, A., et al., Interactions between systemic problems in innovation
systems: The case of energy-efﬁcient houses in the Netherlands. Environ. Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.10.001
of resources (Table 1). Collectively analyzing them shows that, while there are multiple problems that directly relate to
housing associations and potential homebuyers which makes them experience insufﬁcient ﬁnancial resources for energy-
efﬁcient technologies (strict capital requirements, increased landlord fees and limited mortgage options), concurrently the
12 Some housing associations did use land proﬁts from one project to develop ambitious highly energy-efﬁcient houses in another.
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Table  1
Identiﬁed systemic problems related to structural elements and functions.
System function: Systemic problems: Structural element:
Entrepreneurial activities – Impenetrable entry barrier for new companies Actor/Interactions
–  Open land market Institutions
–  Land Scarcity Infrastructure
–  Landowners create consortia Interactions
–  Construction claim Institutions
– Monopoly position for land-owners Institutions
Knowledge development Interviewees mentioned no problems related to knowledge development. –
Knowledge diffusion – Knowledge insufﬁciency (of potential homebuyers) Actors
–  Distrust (between housing associations and construction companies) Actors/Institutions
Guidance of search – Decentralization of housebuilding activities Institutions
–  Conservatism Institutions
–  Public organizations behave like private enterprises Actors
–  Municipalities create detailed development plans Actors/Institutions
–  Project initiators tighten speciﬁcations Actors
– Innovative ambitions water down under commercial pressure Actors/Interactions
–  Project initiators choose for project-based approach Actors
–  Strict permit requirements Actors/Institutions
Market formation – Decentralization of housebuilding activities Institutions
–  Open land market Institutions
–  Limited role for potential buyers Actors
– Very few self-built houses Infrastructure
–  Energy-efﬁciency measures are low on the priority list of potential homebuyers Actors
–  Few energy-efﬁcient technologies in building design Infrastructure
–  Lobby for removing or downscaling remaining innovations Actors/Infrastructure
Mobilization of resources – Strict capital requirements (for housing associations) Infrastructure
–  Increased landlord fees (for housing associations) Infrastructure
– Housing associations face insufﬁcient ﬁnancial resources Actors/Infrastructure
–  Limited mortgage options (for potential homebuyers) Infrastructure/Institutions
–  Expensive consultants and architects Actors
–  Residual land value calculation methodology Institutions
–  Land Scarcity Infrastructure
–  Speculation on land-prices and land-development Actors
–  High proﬁts for land-owners (before ﬁnancial crisis) Infrastructure
–  Tender on price Institutions
–  Chain pressure for construction companies Interactions
–  Project-based approach is inefﬁcient and expensive Interactions/Institutions
–  Insufﬁcient ﬁnancial resources for energy-efﬁcient technologies Infrastructure
Creation of legitimacy – Vested interests Actors/Institutions
–  Conservatism Institutions
–  Construction ﬂaws and technical problems Infrastructure
p
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c–  Project initiators choose for project-based approach Actors/Institutions
–  Lobby for removing or downscaling remaining innovations Actors/Infrastructure
roject-based approach is inefﬁcient and expensive, and there are high-proﬁts for landowners. In other words, solving the
roblem of insufﬁcient ﬁnancial resources for energy-efﬁcient technologies as experienced by housing associations and potential
omebuyers, can also be achieved indirectly, by reducing the proﬁts for landowners (through restructuring the land market),
nd by making the building process more efﬁcient (through changing the project-based approach). Analyzing these problems
ollectively provides the insight that the real problem seems to be an uneven distribution of ﬁnancial resources among actor
roups, making direct intervention on all problems not necessary or desirable.
If our problem analysis would have stopped after independent problems were identiﬁed, and the results would thus
ave resembled Table 1, recommendations would have been different. They probably would have included interventions for
ll identiﬁed problems, for example increasing the maximum mortgage options for potential homebuyers, and easing the
trict capital requirements and lowering the landlord fees for housing associations. However, taking into account that these
roblems interact, reveals that increasing ﬁnancial resources of homebuyers and housing associations will likely only lead to
igher proﬁts for landowners as a result of the residual land value calculation methodology (Section 4.1). Such interventions
ould clearly not achieve the goal of increasing investments in energy-efﬁcient technologies. To put it in other words: the
additionality’ of such interventions is questionable (Chaminade and Edquist, 2010).
The earlier innovation systems analysis of the same empirical domain (Faber and Hoppe, 2013) did not reveal all systemicPlease cite this article in press as: Kieft, A., et al., Interactions between systemic problems in innovation
systems: The case of energy-efﬁcient houses in the Netherlands. Environ. Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.10.001
roblems that form this ﬁrst blocking mechanism. They mention that low income homebuyers experience difﬁculties in
etting a mortgage and that the project-based approach is a source of sectoral fragmentation, but do not mention the high
osts of the project-based approach, or the problems related to the land-market, such as the residual land value calculation
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methodology. Continually searching for an underlying problem – which was  a fundamental part of our analysis – led to
more problems being revealed and thus increased insights compared to this earlier innovation systems analysis of the same
empirical domain.
The second blocking mechanism (right side of Fig. 3) relates to how project initiators and construction companies react
to each other during the building process. Analyzing these problems collectively provides the following insight: project ini-
tiators and construction companies both blame the other and take protective measures against each other. Project initiators
blame the construction companies for their lobby to remove or downscale innovations from the project, and for construction
ﬂaws and technical problems. However, construction companies see this as a logical reaction to the chain pressure created by
the tender on price together with tight project speciﬁcations. If we look at this more closely, all of these ‘problems’ only arise
when the inefﬁcient and expensive project-based approach is followed. This raises the question: is the project-based approach
itself not to blame? Changing to an alternative house building process has the potential to alleviate all these problems in
one go, for example by using Building Concepts.
If this innovation systems analysis was stopped after independent problems were identiﬁed; in other words, if the results
would have resembled Table 1, interventions would have probably been formulated for all identiﬁed problems. For instance,
that project initiators should tender on more criteria than only price, that construction companies should be involved
earlier in the house building process, and that employees of construction companies need additional training to install new
technologies. Although such interventions may  have some effect, they focus on symptoms and keep the underlying problem
intact, namely the expensive ﬁrst phases of the project-based approach.
The earlier innovation systems analysis of the same empirical domain by Faber and Hoppe (2013) does identify multiple of
the systemic problems that are part of this second blocking mechanism, but largely overlook that they interact. They mention
that there is a “myopic competition on prices” (p636), a ‘circle of blame’ in which actors “have no difﬁculty in recognizing
shortcomings of other agents” (p634), and a sectoral fragmentation that is caused by the project-based approach. Our
analysis not only revealed additional problems (for example the chain pressure for construction companies and their lobby
for removing or downscaling innovation), but also how these systemic problems collectively form a blocking mechanism.
Due to the differences between the innovation systems analysis of Faber and Hoppe (2013) and our analysis, it is not
surprising that also the interventions put forward vary. Faber and Hoppe (2013) focus on encouraging sectoral integration,
and on “setting project tendering conditions that favor cooperation on a wider set of sustainability criteria” (p636). In other
words, they focus on interventions that try to improve the current project-based approach. This contrasts with our analysis
that showed why the project-based approach may  itself be part of the problem, and how the inefﬁciency of the project-based
approach is itself preceded by an inefﬁcient land-market. Restructuring the land-market, in combination with opting for an
alternative approach to organize the house building process, for instance by using Building Concepts, may  provide better
results.
5. Discussion
The explicit attention that we gave to how problems interact – both during data collection and analysis – added
explanatory power to our innovation system analysis. The use of the building phases during the interviews stimulated
the interviewees to mention how problems interact: if they mentioned a problem and allocated it to a certain phase of the
building process, they would often start mentioning additional problems from an earlier or later phase in the building pro-
cess. This led to rich data: more problems were identiﬁed compared to an earlier analysis of the Dutch sectoral innovation
system (Faber and Hoppe, 2013). In addition, the insights gained from this analysis into how problems interact made it
possible to identify two blocking ‘mechanisms’ that consist of interacting systemic problems. Analyzing these mechanisms
showed that direct intervention on all identiﬁed problems is in this case not necessary and that targeting only the symptoms
probably has counterproductive effects. Our ﬁndings have three main implications for the policy formulation process.
First, analyzing systemic problems as mechanisms may  reveal that some ‘problems’ are actually symptoms of other
problems. When this happens, it should signal a policy maker that a single targeted intervention on the underlying problem
may  be more fruitful than formulating interventions for all problems separately. Unfortunately, it is often more difﬁcult
to intervene on an underlying problem compared to intervening on a symptom. An example from the ﬁrst mechanism
discussed in this paper is that intervening on how the land-market is organized will probably create more resistance from
vested actors compared to reducing the landlord fees for housing associations. If a policy maker cannot target the underlying
problem because of such practical reasons, she/he should also be careful with targeting the symptoms only, because our
analysis showed that such interventions may  be negated by reactions elsewhere in the system and have counterproductive
effects. To conclude, the act of problem diagnosis is just as important as the act of intervention formulation itself, and should
get the attention it deserves.
Second, this study sheds some additional light on the question whether policy makers should strive for gradual or radical
institutional change. Some authors have emphasized that substantial institutional change can be achieved through a gradual
process (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010). However, in relation to our case study, it is highly questionable if the project-basedPlease cite this article in press as: Kieft, A., et al., Interactions between systemic problems in innovation
systems: The case of energy-efﬁcient houses in the Netherlands. Environ. Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016),
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approach and the land-market can be changed through such a gradual process. For example, although incremental changes
have made building projects today vastly different from ﬁfty years ago, the general idea of how houses ought to be built
has remained the same (the project-based-approach). Although further gradual institutional change may  lead to efﬁciency
improvements in the project-based approach, it will not lead to its demise. If policy makers have the ambition to alleviate
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he whole blocking mechanism, for instance by replacing the project-based approach with an approach that revolves around
uilding concepts, it is necessary to strive for more radical policy change, or punctuation (Kern, 2011, 2014).
The third implication for policy formulation is that the best place to intervene is often not in the system itself, but in its
ontext. A blocking mechanism under its new meaning will often consist of a combination of internal systemic problems
nd contextual systemic problems. Since the problems that form the mechanism interact, an intervention on a contextual
roblem may  indirectly lead to the alleviation of internal systemic problems. To reveal blocking mechanisms that go beyond
he immediate system boundary, an analyst needs to trace the origin of internal systemic problems, which will lead him/her
o contextual problems. In practice, this means that additional interviews are held when problems are identiﬁed for which
ause or consequence remains unclear. Such a process will reveal structural couplings between the innovation system and
ts context. The variety of used shape outlines in Fig. 2 signiﬁes that there are many structural couplings between the
echnological, sectoral and national parts of this innovation system. Additionally, tracing the origin of internal systemic
roblems in the system context also reduces the risk of loose ends in an innovation systems analysis. For example, at ﬁrst
t was not clear to us what was causing the lack of ﬁnancial resources for potential homebuyers and housing associations.
his ‘loose end’ signaled us to perform additional interviews and ultimately led to the identiﬁcation of contextual problems
hat were underlying this lack of ﬁnancial resources, namely issues related to how the land market is organized.
The alternative conceptualization of the terms blocking mechanism and systemic problem used during the case study
ontributed to its explanatory power. Seeing a blocking mechanism as a ‘mechanism’ that consists of interacting systemic
roblems stimulates an analyst to reveal how problems interact. An analyst can do so by adding an additional analysis
tep after independent problems have been identiﬁed. What is more, a broader meaning of the term systemic problem
hat incorporates not only internal systemic problems (endogenous), but also contextual systemic problems (exogenous)
timulates an analyst to give attention to the system context. This conceptual adaptation does justice to the recent discussion
bout the importance of system context (Bergek et al., 2015). One key issue for further consideration is the conceptual clarity
f the term system ‘failure’. As already mentioned in the Theory section, this term is sometimes used as synonym for systemic
roblem and sometimes to indicate broader issues with an innovation system.13 More work is necessary to get the conceptual
ink clear between system failures and the conceptualization of blocking mechanisms and systemic problems as proposed
n this paper.
Although the innovative approach presented in this paper proved useful during our case study there are still areas that
eed further consideration. This approach makes performing an innovation systems analysis more complex, requiring high
nalytical skills and more time. It also raises additional questions. For example, when are sufﬁcient problems from the context
aken into account and when can the analysis stop? How should an analyst cope with conﬂicting perceptions of interviewees
n how the problems are related? In addition, questions remain open about the applicability of the approach for different
ypes of innovation systems. For instance, is this approach only useful for more mature and locked-in innovation systems
hat are going through a transition, or also for other types of innovation systems? To make the approach more practical for
nalysts, performing additional case studies may  prove favorable.
. Conclusion
The innovation systems approach is already a powerful framework to ﬁnd ways for stimulating innovation. It strives to
mprove the performance of the innovation system by identifying systemic problems and by formulating interventions that
ay alleviate these problems. However, a discussion of literature on problems in innovation systems revealed that the com-
lexity focus of the framework is not so apparent in how the framework identiﬁes problems and formulates interventions.
his led to the premise that the innovation systems framework may beneﬁt from more attention to how problems interact
nd can form mechanisms. The main question that this paper explored is: Does an innovation system analysis giving explicit
ttention to problem interactions yield contrasting or additional insights compared to an analysis of independent problems?
A case study of the innovation system related to building energy-efﬁcient houses in the Netherlands was carried out
uring which we gave explicit attention to how problems interact. We used an innovative interview method that led to the
dentiﬁcation of more problems compared to an earlier study of the same empirical domain. Additionally, we  changed the
eaning of the term blocking mechanism into a ‘mechanism’ that consists of interacting systemic problems. This led to the
dentiﬁcation of ‘mechanisms’ of interacting problems, instead of to the identiﬁcation of independent problems. In the case
f energy-efﬁcient houses in the Netherlands, many problems can be traced back to how proﬁts from land are distributed
mong stakeholders, and to the project-based approach as the dominant organizing principle of the building process. Earlier
tudies have focused on interventions that increase the efﬁciency of the project-based approach, and in this way  overlook
he possibility of moving toward an alternative organization of the building process, for instance based on building concepts.Please cite this article in press as: Kieft, A., et al., Interactions between systemic problems in innovation
systems: The case of energy-efﬁcient houses in the Netherlands. Environ. Innovation Soc. Transitions (2016),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2016.10.001
hese ﬁndings indicate that understanding how systemic problems interact and form mechanisms is of key importance for
esigning policy measures and intervention strategies. Neglecting problem interactions in innovation systems may  not only
ead to inaccurate problem diagnosis, but also to ineffective or even counterproductive interventions.
13 For instance, in Klein Woolthuis et al. (2005) the terms systemic failure and system failure are used interchangeably and mean the same as the term
ystemic problem in Wieczorek and Hekkert (2012), whereas in Weber and Rohracher (2012) the term structural system failure is a synonym for systemic
roblems, while the term transformational system failures indicates broader system issues.
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This paper showed that the innovation system framework may beneﬁt from more explicit attention to how systemic
problems interact, inﬂuence each other, and may  form mechanisms. This may  be achieved by conceptually recognizing that
links between systemic problems provide important explanatory power and contribute to accurate problem diagnosis. Areas
for further consideration are the type of innovation systems for which an analysis of interacting problems as ‘mechanisms’
is most fruitful, at which point to stop such an analysis and how to turn the approach into a more practical analysis tool.
In addition, the link between the concepts of blocking mechanisms and systemic problems as used in this paper, and the
concept of system failures needs to be further explored. To conclude, increasing attention for interactions between systemic
problems contributes to an innovation systems framework that is well positioned to diagnose problems and formulate
interventions.
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